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(ANTI)-SLAPP HAPPY IN FEDERAL COURT?: THE
APPLICABILITY OF STATE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES IN
FEDERAL COURT AND THE NEED FOR FEDERAL
PROTECTION AGAINST SLAPPS
Caitlin E. Daday +

During the summer of 2018, Florida citizen Thomas Lloyd’s beloved pet
poodle, Rembrandt, died an untimely death after DeLand Animal Hospital
delayed an essential surgery. 1 Subsequently, Mr. Lloyd posted what he thought
was a “simple” and “honest review” of the animal hospital on Yelp. 2 Following
his post, DeLand Animal Hospital and one of its veterinarians sued him,
accusing him of defamation and requiring him to spend $26,000 in legal bills—
over $6,000 more than his annual Social Security income. 3
Mr. Lloyd’s experience with expensive but meritless litigation is not unique.
Meritless lawsuits that are designed to intimidate and punish people for speaking
out are unfortunately becoming increasingly common. 4 These suits, known as
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPP suits, 5 are meritless
lawsuits filed not with the primary purpose of winning;6 rather, the plaintiff’s
objective is to chill the defendant’s speech.7 Unlike conventional lawsuits,
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J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2021; B.A., Villanova
University, 2018. I would like to thank Professor Mark Rienzi for his guidance, the staff and editors
of the Catholic University Law Review for their work on this paper, and my parents, Bob and
Donna, for their support.
1. Posting a Negative Review Online Can Get You Sued, CBS NEWS: CBS THIS MORNING
(July 22, 2019, 7:39 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/posting-a-negative-review-online-canget-you-sued/; Frank Fernandez, DeLand Animal Hospital Sues Dog-Owner, Claiming Defamation
in Yelp Review, THE DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J. (Dec. 8, 2018, 7:27 AM), https://www.newsjournalonline.com/news/20181208/deland-animal-hospital-sues-dog-owner-claiming-defamationin-yelp-review.
2. Posting a Negative Review Online Can Get You Sued, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. See Jeremiah A. Ho, I’ll Huff and I’ll Puff—But Then You’ll Blow My Case Away: Dealing
with Dismissed and Bad-Faith Defendants Under California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute, 30 WHITTIER
L. REV. 533, 551–52 (2009); Posting a Negative Review Online Can Get You Sued, supra note 1.
5. Professors George W. Pring and Penelope Canan conceived the acronym “SLAPP” in the
late 1980s. See Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 385, 386
(1988).
6. John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problems of SLAPPs, 26
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 399 (1993).
7. Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary
on its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 803–04 (2000).
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which often seek to compensate a harm or correct a wrong, 8 SLAPPs seek to use
the cost and burdens of litigation to prevent citizens from exercising their First
Amendment rights of speech and petition or to penalize them for doing so. 9
SLAPPs often implicate the defendant’s constitutional speech and petitioning
rights and involve limited types of claims, such as defamation. 10 They are
dangerous because they punish “average citizens exercising their constitutional
right[s]” with costly and time-consuming litigation. 11 As one New York judge
wrote about SLAPPs, “[s]hort of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First
Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined.” 12
Because the filers 13 of SLAPPs are not principally motivated by actually
winning the lawsuit, “traditional safeguards” meant to protect targets from
frivolous actions are unable to protect them from SLAPPs. 14 As a result, as of
January 2021, thirty states plus the District of Columbia and Guam have enacted
what are known as anti-SLAPP statutes 15 in an effort “to give more breathing
8. Victor J. Cosentino, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: An Analysis of the
Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 402 (1991).
9. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE
ENV’T L. REV. 3, 5–6 (1989). SLAPPs are frequently filed with at least one “of four motives:
retaliation for successful opposition, discouraging future opposition, intimidation, and as a strategic
tool in a political battle.” Cosentino, supra note 8, at 402.
10. See Op. of the Justs., 641 A.2d 1012, 1014 (N.H. 1994); Thomas A. Waldman, Comment,
SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Law and in the Court’s Responses to Frivolous
Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979, 984 (1992). There are six typical categories of claims used in
SLAPP suits, including: defamation, business torts, judicial-administrative torts, conspiracy,
constitutional and civil rights violations, and other wrongs, such as nuisance or invasion of privacy.
George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation”
(“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 947
(1992).
11. Alice Glover & Marcus Jimison, S.L.A.P.P. Suits: A First Amendment Issue and Beyond,
21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 122, 122–23 (1995).
12. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
13. SLAPPs can be, and are frequently, brought as both claims and counterclaims. See Pring
& Canan, supra note 10, at 946. For the sake of simplicity, this Comment refers to the party
bringing the SLAPP suit as the “filer,” and to the party against whom the SLAPP suit is brought as
the “target.”
14. Wilcox v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450 (Ct. App. 1994). “Traditional
safeguards” include suits for malicious prosecution or abuse of process and sanctions. Id.
15. Austin Vining & Sarah Matthews, Introduction to Anti-SLAPP Laws, Reporters Comm.
for Freedom of the Press, https://www.rcfp.org/introduction-anti-slapp-guide/#:~:text=As
%20of%20January%202021%2C%2030,New%20York%2C%20Oklahoma%2C%20Oregon%2C
(last visited Apr. 7, 2021). These states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. Id.
Minnesota’s and Washington’s legislatures have also both enacted anti-SLAPP statutes. Id.
However, each state’s supreme court has found parts of each state’s statute to be unconstitutional.
See id.; Leiendecker v. Asian Women United, 895 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2017); Davis v. Cox, 351
P.3d 862 (Wash. 2015), overruled in part on other grounds by Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v.
Thurston Cnty., 423 P.3d 223 (Wash. 2018).
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space for free speech.” 16 Anti-SLAPP statutes aim to prevent citizens from
being dragged into court for exercising their First Amendment rights and
engaging in public debate 17 and are meant to “screen meritless claims pursued
to chill one’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment.” 18 Generally,
these statutes attempt to protect these rights by ending SLAPP suits at an early
stage in the litigation and helping the target avoid significant legal costs. 19
Anti-SLAPP statutes vary from state to state, but they often contain similar
features. 20 The most notable feature of anti-SLAPP statutes is what is often
called the special motion to strike. 21 The special motion gives targets the ability
to summarily dismiss the action earlier than they would be able to with a typical
summary judgment motion. 22 The special motion can be heard before a
summary judgment motion can even be filed and before discovery can be
conducted. 23 Often, the special motion permits a judge to dismiss a suit unless
the filer “has established that there is a probability that the [filer] will prevail on
the claim.” 24 In order to establish a probability of success, “the [filer] must
16. Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
17. Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 106 P.3d 958, 967 (Cal. 2005) (quoting People ex rel.
Lockyer v. Brar, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 846 (Ct. App. 2004)).
18. Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164, 169 (5th Cir. 2009).
19. Tate, supra note 7, at 801.
20. For a comprehensive overview and listing of each state’s anti-SLAPP statute, see Thomas
R. Burke, Anti-SLAPP Litigation, §§ 8.1–8.35, Westlaw (database last updated Sept. 2020). In an
effort to increase uniformity across state anti-SLAPP laws, the Uniform Law Commission—the
group responsible for creating the Uniform Commercial Code—recently adopted the Uniform
Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA). Laura Prather, Anti-SLAPP Circuit Split Makes State
Protections Uncertain, Law360 (Aug. 27, 2020, 5:27 PM) https://www-law360com.cualaw.idm.oclc.org/articles/1304859/anti-slapp-circuit-split-makes-state-protectionsuncertain; see generally Unif. Pub. Expression Prot. Act (Unif. L. Comm’n 2020). UPEPA is
intended to serve as a model for state anti-SLAPP statutes that provides broad First Amendment
protections. Prather, supra. UPEPA strongly resembles the statutes of the states such as California
that already have strong anti-SLAPP statutes in place. See Unif. Pub. Expression Prot. Act §§ 3–
14 (Unif. L. Comm’n 2020). Cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2015).
21. See CIV. PROC. § 425.16(b)(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1) (West 2016); LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971(A)(1) (2012). Maine and the District of Columbia have a similar motion
called a special motion to dismiss. See D.C. CODE § 16-5502(a) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 556 (West 2012). The Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) also provides for a similar
motion to dismiss. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(a) (West 2019).
22. Basil S. Shiber & Douglas M. Smith, SLAPP Happy: An Analysis of California’s AntiSLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) Statute, 15 No. 2 Miller & Starr, Real
Estate Newsalert 1, 2 (Nov. 2004).
23. Id.
24. CIV. PROC. § 425.16(b)(1). See also § 9-11-11.1; CIV. CODE PROC. art. 971(A)(1). In
Texas, the filer must establish “by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential
element of the claim in question.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(c) (West 2019).
In the District of Columbia, the filer must demonstrate “that the claim is likely to succeed on the
merits.” § 16-5502(b). Under the Maine statute, the filer must show “that the [target’s] exercise
of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law
and that the [target’s] acts caused actual injury to the [filer].” Tit. 14, § 556.
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demonstrate [that] the complaint is legally sufficient and supported by a
sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” 25 In deciding on the motion, the
court can typically consider the pleadings, as well as affidavits from both sides. 26
Most anti-SLAPP statutes also entitle prevailing targets to reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs. 27 Typically, the special motion is filed in the early stages of the
lawsuit, often within forty-five to ninety days of service, 28 and discovery is
frequently stayed upon filing the motion. 29
In many states, state court defendants in a position similar to Mr. Lloyd can
readily take advantage of their respective state’s anti-SLAPP statute to quickly
dismiss SLAPPs. However, a question has arisen regarding whether such
defendants can avail themselves of the protections of state anti-SLAPP statutes
in federal court due to the statutes’ close alignment with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 8, 12, and 56, because both purport to govern the pre-trial
dismissal of claims. 30 This issue is significant because the inapplicability of
state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court requires targets to spend more time
and money embroiled in frivolous litigation than they otherwise would in state
court, and it encourages SLAPP filers to bring these suits in federal court so that
they can more effectively achieve their goal of silencing the target. 31
In this Comment, I will argue that state anti-SLAPP statutes should not apply
in federal court because they answer the same question as Rules 8, 12, and 56.
In doing so, I will examine the development of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence where state statutes have conflicted with the Federal Rules and
provide background on the circuit split over the applicability of state antiSLAPP statutes in federal court. Then, I will discuss why state anti-SLAPP laws
25. Wilcox v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 454 (Ct. App. 1994). See also RCO Legal,
P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 820 S.E.2d 491, 498 n. 10 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). Under the District of
Columbia’s statute, to establish the likelihood of success on the merits, a filer must “present an
evidentiary basis that would permit a reasonable, properly instructed jury to find in the [filer’s]
favor.” Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1262 (D.C. 2016).
26. The affidavits must “stat[e] the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” CIV.
PROC. § 425.16(b)(2). See also § 9-11-11.1(b)(2); Civ. Code Proc. art. 971(A)(2); tit. 14, § 556.
27. See CIV. PROC. § 425.16(c)(1); D.C. CODE § 5504(a) (2012); § 9-11-11.1(b.1); CIV. CODE
PROC. art. 971(B); tit. 14, § 556; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.009(a)(1) (West 2019).
28. In the District of Columbia, the special motion to dismiss may be filed within 45 days
after service of the claim. § 16-5502(a). In California, Maine, and Texas, the special motion may
be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint. CIV. PROC. § 425.16(f); tit. 14, § 556; Civ.
Prac. & Rem. § 27.003(b). Louisiana allows special motions to strike to be filed within ninety days
of service. CIV. CODE PROC. art. 971(C)(1).
29. See CIV. PROC. § 425.16(g); § 16-5502(c)(1); § 9-11-11.1(d); CIV. CODE PROC. art.
971(D); tit. 14, § 556; Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 27.003(c).
30. See generally Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2019); Carbone v. CNN, Inc.,
910 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2018); Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015);
Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed
Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999).
31. See Godin, 629 F.3d at 91–92; Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973.
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should not apply in federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction. I will
conclude by proposing two federal anti-SLAPP solutions: an amendment to the
Federal Rules to heighten the pleading standard in SLAPP suits and a federal
anti-SLAPP statute.
I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Supreme Court’s Controlling Federal Rule Jurisprudence
In diversity cases where the issue is whether a state or federal law should
apply, a court may apply “the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice[,]” 32 under
which “federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law.” 33 However, in situations covered by the Federal Rules, courts
will apply the relevant Rule, unless it is either invalid under the Rules Enabling
Act 34 or unconstitutional. 35 Several federal appellate courts have not applied
state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal diversity cases, concluding that the antiSLAPP statutes conflict with Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56 because both the antiSLAPP statutes and the Rules govern pre-trial dismissal of claims. 36 With
respect to anti-SLAPP statutes, the question is whether or not they cover a
situation already addressed by the Federal Rules. This section discusses the
Supreme Court’s consideration of whether a state statute covers a situation
addressed by the Federal Rules.
The Supreme Court first considered a state law conflicting with a Federal Rule
in Hanna v. Plumer. 37 There, Massachusetts law required in-hand service to an
executor of an estate, but FRCP 4 permitted various methods of service. 38 The
Court first determined that “the clash [was] unavoidable” because the Federal
Rules did not exclusively require in-hand service 39 and subsequently that FRCP
4 was valid because the manner of service “relates to the ‘practice and procedure
of the district courts.’” 40 In so holding, the Court noted that “[t]o hold that a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the
mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the
Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to
exercise that power in the Enabling Act.” 41

32. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
33. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018).
35. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
36. See generally Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, (5th Cir. 2019); Carbone v. CNN, Inc.,
910 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2018); Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
37. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461.
38. Id. at 461–62. FRCP 4(d)(1) permitted in-hand service as well as other methods. Id.
39. Id. at 470.
40. Id. at 464 (citing Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435, 439 (1880)).
41. Id. at 473–74.
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The Court next discussed conflicts between state laws and the Federal Rules
in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 42 The Court reiterated that, where a Federal
Rule applies, the proper test is “whether the Rule [i]s within the scope of the
Rules Enabling Act.” 43 In doing so, the Court stated that “the Hanna analysis is
premised on a ‘direct collision’ between the Federal Rule and the state law.” 44
Thus, the first question regarding any conflicting state laws and Federal Rules
must be “whether the scope of the Federal Rule . . . is sufficiently broad to
control the issue.” 45 Walker involved a conflict between a state law that deemed
an action as commenced for statute of limitations purposes when the defendant
was served and FRCP 3, which says that an action is commenced when it is
filed. 46 The Court held that the rules could co-exist because each controls “its
own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.” 47
In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, the Court wrestled with a state
law that imposed a mandatory affirmance penalty on unsuccessful appeals and
whether or not it conflicted with Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 38, which
affords federal appellate judges the discretion to award damages and costs to
appellees who are victims of frivolous appeals. 48 In addressing the issue of
whether Rule 38’s scope “[was] ‘sufficiently broad’ to cause a ‘direct collision’
with the state law,” 49 the Court determined that the Rule’s discretionary
allowance of awards for frivolous appeals “unmistakably conflict[ed]” with the
state’s mandatory affirmance penalty because the two rules’ “mode[s] of
operation” were directly opposed to one another. 50 Further, the Court contended
that the purposes of the rules were “sufficiently coextensive” so as to require the
determination that the rules operated within the same sphere, precluding
application of the state law in a federal diversity suit. 51
Most recently, the Court addressed the issue of controlling Federal Rules in
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. 52 In that
case the Court dealt with a state statute “which preclude[d] a suit to recover a
‘penalty’ from proceeding as a class action,” and considered whether that statute
conflicted with FRCP 23, which governs the maintenance of class actions in

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 741 (1980).
Id. at 748 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470–72).
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id. at 742–43.
Id. at 752.
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4 (1987).
Id. at 4–5 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 749–50).
Id. at 7.
Id.
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
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federal court. 53 A divided court ultimately held that Rule 23 was valid and
controlled. 54
In the majority opinion, signed onto by five justices, Justice Scalia addressed
“whether Rule 23 answers the question in dispute,” which was whether the suit
could be maintained as a class action. 55 The majority agreed that the state law
“attempt[ed] to answer the same question” as Rule 23 because it, like Rule 23,
addressed when a suit could proceed as a class action. 56 Justice Scalia contended
that, “even if [the state statute] aim[ed] to restrict the remedy a plaintiff can
obtain, [it] achieve[d] that end by limiting a plaintiff’s power to maintain a class
action.” 57 Thus, the majority held that Rule 23 must apply in federal diversity
suits unless it was invalid. 58
Writing on behalf of four justices, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion addressed
the validity of Rule 23 under the Rules Enabling Act by asking whether the Rule
“really regulat[es] procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them.” 59 What matters is not whether or
not the rule affects a party’s substantive rights, but rather what the rule regulates:
“[i]f it governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ rights
are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules of decision by which [the] court
will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.” 60 In this case, while each rule did have
some effect on the parties’ rights, they merely regulated the mechanism for
enforcing them. 61 In other words, the rules only served to regulate procedure
and did not alter the parties’ rights, remedies, or the rules of decision. 62 As a
result, the plurality concluded that Rule 23 is valid under the Rules Enabling
Act. 63
Justice Stevens joined the majority in holding that Rule 23 controlled in this
situation and concurred in the judgment; however, he proposed a different test
for determining validity under the Rules Enabling Act. 64 To him, the Federal
Rules cannot “govern [if] the rule would displace a state law that is [generally]
procedural . . . but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions
53. Id. at 397–98.
54. Id. at 399, 408, 410.
55. Id. at 398.
56. Id. at 399.
57. Id. at 403.
58. Id. at 399.
59. Id. at 407 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). This test derives
from the Court’s holding in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., which addressed the validity of Federal Rules
35 and 37. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 4.
60. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (alteration in original) (quoting Mississippi Publ’g Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)).
61. Id. at 407–08.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 408.
64. Id. at 416–17, 419 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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to define the scope of the state-created right.” 65 However, “[t]here must be little
doubt” that the federal rule would affect a state-created right. 66 Here, because
he determined that the text of the state statute applied to all claims based on any
state’s law, it could not serve to alter the state’s rights or remedies. 67 Therefore,
he agreed that Rule 23 was valid. 68
Justice Stevens also agreed with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent “that courts should
‘avoi[d] immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would trench on
state prerogatives,’ and should in some instances ‘interpre[t] the federal rules to
avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies.’” 69 However, he did not
agree with the dissent’s method. 70 The dissent contended that Rule 23 did not
conflict with the state law because it governed the procedure for litigating class
actions while the state law set the dimensions of the claim and limited the size
of a monetary award. 71 Justice Ginsburg believed that the real question was
about the remedy and creation of the right to recover, which Rule 23 did not
answer. 72 Rather, Rule 23 only concerns “[t]he fair and efficient conduct of
class litigation.” 73 Because the dissent did not see any conflict between Rule 23
and the state law, it analyzed the issue under the traditional Erie tests, concluding
that the law was substantive and should have applied here. 74 Justice Ginsburg
did not think that there was a conflict with the Federal Rules, so she did not
weigh in on the appropriate test under the Rules Enabling Act.
B. The Circuit Split
Applying the Supreme Court’s precedent, the circuits have split on whether
Rules 8, 12, and 56 sufficiently cover pre-trial dismissal of claims to make state
anti-SLAPP statutes inapplicable in federal court. The First and Ninth Circuits
have both applied state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court. 75 Conversely, the
Second, Fifth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have all declined to
apply state anti-SLAPP statutes. 76 This section addresses the split and the
rationale behind the courts’ decisions.
65. Id. at 423.
66. Id. at 432.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 436.
69. Id. at 430 (alteration in original).
70. Id. at 430–31.
71. Id. at 446–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 450.
73. Id. at 447.
74. Id. at 452–58.
75. See generally Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010); United States ex rel.
Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999).
76. See generally La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020); Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d
240 (5th Cir. 2019); Carbone v. CNN, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2018); Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y
Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Tenth Circuit has also held that New Mexico’s
anti-SLAPP statute is inapplicable in federal court. See Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v.
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1. (Anti)-SLAPP Happy in the Ninth and First Circuits
In 1999, prior to Shady Grove, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal
appellate court to apply a state anti-SLAPP statute in federal court in United
States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. 77 The court
considered whether there was a “direct collision” between the California antiSLAPP statute and Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56. 78 If a target was unsuccessful
on a special motion to strike, he could still bring a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a
motion for summary judgement, so the court concluded that the anti-SLAPP
statute and the Federal Rules could co-exist in their own spheres. 79 While the
court admitted that the statute and the rules did have “similar purpose[s,]” the
anti-SLAPP statute was intended to serve a purpose that the Federal Rules do
not address—the protection of First Amendment rights. 80 Additionally, the
court commented that plaintiffs would have a significant incentive to forum shop
if it held that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. 81 Thus, California’s antiSLAPP statute applied in federal court. 82
Nearly two decades later, in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.
v. Center for Medical Progress, the Ninth Circuit re-considered the application
of state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal courts. 83 While generally reaffirming
Newsham, the court limited their application with an intent to eliminate conflict
with the Federal Rules. 84 In doing so, the court held that “when an anti-SLAPP
motion to strike challenges only the legal sufficiency of a claim, a district court
AmeriCulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659 (10th Cir. 2018). The decision in that case turned on unique
language in New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute, which permitted “a special motion to dismiss,
motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary judgment that shall be considered
by the court on a priority or expedited basis.” Id. at 663; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1.A–
C (LexisNexis 2020). Concluding that the plain language of the statute showed that it was purely
procedural and set forth no substantive law, the court determined that the statute could not apply in
federal court. Los Lobos Renewable Power, 885 F.3d at 668–673. Notably, the Supreme Court
declined to grant certiorari and hear this case. See AmeriCulture, Inc. v. Los Lobos Renewable
Power, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 591 (2018). Similarly, in Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Basel Action Network,
the Seventh Circuit was asked to review the district court’s determination that Washington’s antiSLAPP statute’s special motion to strike conflicted with FRCP 12(d) and was therefore inapplicable
in federal court. 791 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2015). However, the Washington Supreme Court held
the state’s anti-SLAPP statute unconstitutional, so while at least one court within the Seventh
Circuit has found anti-SLAPP statutes inapplicable in federal court, the Seventh Circuit did not
need to address the question itself. Id. at 731–32.
77. See generally Newsham, 190 F.3d 963.
78. Id. at 972.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 972–73.
81. Id. at 973. The court noted that a ruling that incentives filers to forum shop would work
directly against the Erie Doctrine’s “twin aims.” Id.
82. Id. at 972–73.
83. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828 (9th Cir.
2018).
84. Id. at 833–34.
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should apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard and consider
whether a claim is properly stated.” 85 Conversely, “when an anti-SLAPP motion
to strike challenges the factual sufficiency of a claim, then the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 standard will apply,” and “discovery must be allowed.” 86 By
interpreting the anti-SLAPP statute to avoid collision with the Federal Rules, the
court drastically limited the statute’s applicability in federal court. 87
Most recently, in the unpublished decision in Clifford v. Trump, the Ninth
Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Newsham by applying the Texas Citizens
Participation Act (TCPA), Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute, despite the Fifth
Circuit’s refusal to do so. 88 Deciding that the TCPA was virtually identical to
California’s anti-SLAPP statute, the court reasoned that it must apply its own
precedent. 89 In this case, that meant following Newsham and applying the
TCPA. 90
In addition to being the first circuit to apply anti-SLAPP statutes in federal
court, the Ninth Circuit was also the first circuit in which judges began to
question the applicability of the state statutes. First, in his concurrence in
Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC (Makaeff I), Judge Kozinski argued that
Newsham was incorrectly decided and should be reconsidered because the antiSLAPP statute was “quintessentially procedural,” did not create any substantive
rights, and merely dealt with “the conduct of the lawsuit.” 91 Further, the statute
was so disruptive of the federal system that it “cut[ ] an ugly gash through th[e]
orderly process.” 92 Just months later, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition to
rehear the case en banc in Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC (Makaeff II). 93 In
a dissent, Judge Watford, applying Shady Grove, concluded that the anti-SLAPP
statute conflicted with Rules 12 and 56 because the “statute impermissibly
supplements the Federal Rules’ criteria for pre-trial dismissal of an action.” 94
He argued that by “impos[ing] a probability requirement[,]” the anti-SLAPP
85. Id. at 834.
86. Id.; see also Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 845–46 (9th Cir. 2001). In
Metabolife International, Inc. v. Wornick, the Ninth Circuit explained that district courts within the
circuit had found that the discovery provision of the anti-SLAPP statute “directly collided” with
Rule 56 because it limited discovery, while Rule 56 required discovery prior to judgment. Id.
Those district courts had thus concluded that the discovery provision of the state statute could not
apply in federal courts. Id.
87. Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 834–35.
88. Clifford v. Trump, No. 18-56351, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 24196, at *1–2 (9th Cir. July
31, 2020).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC (Makaeff I), 715 F.3d 254, 272–73 (9th Cir. 2013)
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 274.
93. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC (Makaeff II), 736 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2013).
94. Id. at 1188 (Watford, J., dissenting). Judges Kozinski, Paez, and Bea signed onto this
dissent. Id.
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statute not only conflicted with Rule 12’s plausibility standard, but also
“eviscerate[d]” Rule 56’s requirements, greatly heightening both standards. 95
The First Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in applying state anti-SLAPP
statutes in Godin v. Schencks. 96 Following the Ninth Circuit’s lead, the First
Circuit concluded that Erie’s “twin aims” were best promoted by applying antiSLAPP statutes in federal court. 97 Relying heavily on Justice Stevens’s
concurrence in Shady Grove, the court determined that Maine’s anti-SLAPP
statute was “so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it function[ed] to
define the scope of the state-created right,” and thus could not be superseded by
the Federal Rules. 98 Rather than substituting the Federal Rules, the anti-SLAPP
statute served as a “supplemental and substantive rule,” giving targets additional
protection—namely, a procedure to dismiss claims resting on the target’s
protected petitioning conduct. 99 Concluding that Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 56
were not broad enough to control the same issues as Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute,
the court held that the anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal court. 100
2. The District of Columbia, Eleventh, Fifth, and Second Circuits Slap
Down State Anti-SLAPP Statutes
In Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC, the D.C. Circuit became the first
federal court of appeals to formally reject the application of state anti-SLAPP
statutes. 101 Applying Shady Grove, then-Judge Kavanaugh asked “if . . . a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ‘answer[ed] the same question’ as the [antiSLAPP statute,]” which was what circumstances required the court to dismiss
the plaintiff’s claim before it reached trial. 102 He concluded that Rules 12 and
56 did answer the same question in a conflicting manner because they typically
permit a plaintiff to proceed to trial if the plaintiff can satisfy each standard,
whereas the anti-SLAPP statute “set[ ] up an additional hurdle a plaintiff must
jump over to get to trial” by requiring “a plaintiff to show a likelihood of success
on the merits.” 103 Thus, he concluded that Rules 12 and 56 trumped the antiSLAPP statute unless they were invalid under the Rules Enabling Act. 104 To
test that validity, Judge Kavanaugh asked if the rule “really regulates

95. Id. at 1189.
96. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 81 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Steinmetz v. Coyle & Caron,
Inc., 862 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2017) (applying Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP statute).
97. Godin, 629 F.3d at 87, 91.
98. Id. at 89 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.
393, 423 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
99. Id. at 88–89.
100. Id. at 92.
101. Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
102. Id. at 1333–34.
103. Id. at 1334.
104. Id. at 1336.
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procedure.” 105 Here, he easily concluded that Rules 12 and 56 are really
procedural, and thus valid, because the Supreme Court stated in Shady Grove
that “pleading standards and rules governing motions for summary judgment are
procedural.” 106 As a result, federal courts in the D.C. Circuit cannot apply the
District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP statute in diversity cases. 107
The Eleventh Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit in rejecting the application of
anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court three years later in Carbone v. CNN, Inc. 108
Determining that the relevant question was “whether [the] complaint state[d] a
claim for relief supported by sufficient evidence to avoid pretrial dismissal[,]”
the court concluded that the anti-SLAPP statute provided an answer that
conflicted with that of Rules 8, 12, and 56. 109 Like Judge Kavanaugh, Judge
Pryor noted that the anti-SLAPP statute’s pleading standard “differe[d] from
Rules 8 and 12 by requiring” a probability of success 110—a standard that the
district court deemed “a Rule 12(b)(6) ‘plus’ standard for cases with a First
Amendment nexus.” 111 Further, he determined that the state statute conflicted
with Rule 56 by imposing a more stringent evidentiary burden while depriving
plaintiffs of discovery. 112 While acknowledging that Congress has, in both
FRCP 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),113
“formulated additional requirements governing the sufficiency of a complaint,”
he noted that “[t]he fact that Congress has created specific exceptions” to Rules
8, 12, and 56 indicates that they are the general rules, and state statutes cannot
supersede them. 114 He concluded that the Federal Rules “constitute an
exhaustive set of requirements governing pretrial dismissal and entitlements to
discovery and a trial on the merits,” 115 and the anti-SLAPP statute allows
defendants to easily avoid liability for certain protected conduct. 116 Finally, he
determined that the rules were valid under the Rules Enabling Act because they
only affect the process of enforcing a party’s rights. 117

105. Id. (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
106. Id. at 1337.
107. Id.
108. Carbone v. CNN, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2018).
109. Id. at 1350.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1348 (quoting Carbone v. CNN, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-1720-ODE, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 216286, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2017)).
112. Id. at 1351.
113. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2018); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(b).
114. Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1353 (alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)).
115. Id. at 1354.
116. Id. at 1355.
117. Id. at 1357.
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Prior to August 2019, the Fifth Circuit applied state anti-SLAPP statutes in
federal court on three occasions, each time with minimal discussion. 118
However, in Klocke v. Watson, the court held that the TCPA cannot apply in
federal court 119 because it “answer[ed] the same question” as Rules 12 and 56. 120
Judge Jones determined that Shady Grove and Abbas both held that “a state rule
conflicts with a federal procedural rule when it imposes additional procedural
requirements not found in the federal rules.” 121 Because the TCPA sets
additional, higher standards under its burden-shifting framework, the court
concluded that it conflicted with Rules 12 and 56 and thus cannot apply in
federal court. 122 The court concluded by stating that the Rules are valid “because
they define the procedures for determining whether a claim is alleged in a
sufficient manner in a complaint and whether there is a genuine dispute of
material fact sufficient to warrant a trial.” 123 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit does
not apply the TCPA in federal diversity actions. 124
In July 2020, the Second Circuit became the most recent addition to the list of
circuits declining to apply state anti-SLAPP laws in federal court in La Liberte
v. Reid. 125 In La Liberte, the Second Circuit addressed the question of whether
118. See Block v. Tanenhaus, 815 F.3d 218, 221–22 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying Louisiana’s antiSLAPP statute); Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 711 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying the TCPA); Henry v.
Lake Charles Am. Press, LLC., 566 F.3d 164, 168–69 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying Louisiana’s antiSLAPP statute).
119. Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 2019). Notably, the court did not overturn
Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, LLC. See id. at 248–49. Rather, it distinguished Louisiana’s
statute as a different state’s statute with a different standard. Id. The court contended that the
conflict between Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute and the Federal Rules is less evident than that
between the TCPA and the Federal Rules. Id. Additionally, Henry preceded Shady Grove and did
not conduct an analysis of the conflict between the anti-SLAPP statute and the Federal Rules. Id.
Accordingly, the court did not think it was bound by Henry. Id.
120. Id. at 245.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 248 (quoting Carbone v. CNN, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018)).
124. Id. at 249.
125. La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2020). Previously, the Second Circuit had
seemingly applied anti-SLAPP statutes. First, in Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., the court
applied California’s anti-SLAPP statute without significant discussion. Liberty Synergistics, Inc.
v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2013). Then, a year later in Adelson v. Harris, the
court “approved certain aspects of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute.” La Liberte, 966 F.3d at 86 n.3;
see also Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 2014). However, in La Liberte, the court
denied that it ever held anti-SLAPP statutes to be applicable in federal court. La Liberte, 966 F.3d
at 86 n.3. With respect to Liberty Synergistics, the court said that that the only question was
“whether the district court could entertain California’s special motion to strike notwithstanding that
it was applying New York substantive law.” Id. In other words, it did not actually consider whether
the anti-SLAPP statute could be applicable in federal court, and “a later decision in that case . . .
‘expressly declined’” to do so. Id. (quoting Liberty Synergistics, Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 637 F.
App’x 33, 34 n.1 (2d Cir. 2016)). The court deemed Adelson inapplicable because Nevada’s antiSLAPP statute differs significantly from California’s because it does not set forth a probability of
success standard. Id.
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California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal court. 126 Despite Ninth
Circuit precedent, the court conducted its own analysis and determined that the
statute impermissibly conflicted with the Federal Rules. 127 Agreeing with the
D.C., Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, Judge Jacobs reasoned that Rules 12 and 56
already address the question of under what circumstances “a court must dismiss
a plaintiff’s claim before trial.” 128 Further, he noted that the Federal Rules
specifically do not require a showing of probability at either the Rule 12(b)(6)
or 56 stages. 129 Judge Jacobs further commented that the argument that antiSLAPP statutes function as a supplement to the Federal Rules is a policy one;
however, through Rules 12 and 56, the Federal Rules have already made the
relevant policy judgment as to what standards parties should have to meet. 130
Thus, California’s anti-SLAPP statute could not apply in the Second Circuit. 131
II. ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES CANNOT APPLY IN FEDERAL COURT BECAUSE
THEY ANSWER THE SAME QUESTION AS THE FEDERAL RULES AND ARE VALID
UNDER THE RULES ENABLING ACT
Under Shady Grove, there are two steps in determining whether or not
defendants in diverse federal litigation can use the protections afforded by state
anti-SLAPP statutes. 132 First, it must be determined whether or not state antiSLAPP statutes answer the same question as Rules 8, 12, and 56. 133 If so, then
the Federal Rules control, unless they are invalid under the Rules Enabling
Act. 134 This section will argue that state anti-SLAPP statutes cannot apply in
federal court, first by determining that they answer the same question as Rules
8, 12, and 56, and then by concluding that the Federal Rules are valid under the
Rules Enabling Act.
A. Shady Grove Step 1: Anti-SLAPP Statutes Answer the Same Question as
Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56.
Following the test delineated in Shady Grove, the first step in assessing
whether a state statute conflicts with the Federal Rules is to determine whether
or not the state law and the Federal Rules “attempt[ ] to answer the same
question.” 135 As the D.C., Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits have all held, state anti-

126. La Liberte, 966 F.3d at 83.
127. Id. at 83, 87.
128. Id. at 86–87 (quoting Abbas v. Foreign Poly’ Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333–34 (D.C.
Cir. 2015)).
129. Id. at 87.
130. Id. at 88.
131. Id.
132. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 398, 406–07.
135. Id. at 399.
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SLAPP statutes and Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56 not only answer the same
question, but they do so in conflicting ways. 136
Rules 8, 12, and 56 together answer the same question as the anti-SLAPP
statutes: when must a court dismiss a claim before it goes to trial? 137 Rule 8
provides that a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief, 138 and if it does
not, it must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for a failure to state a claim. 139
Rule 56 requires a court to “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” 140 Thus, Rule 8 sets the
standards for the sufficiency of a claim; 141 Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of
the claim; 142 and Rule 56 seeks to ensure that there are genuine issues to be
tried. 143 Meanwhile, anti-SLAPP statutes enable defendants to dismiss claims
arising from their exercise of First Amendment rights through a special motion
to strike, unless the plaintiff can show a probability or likelihood of success on
the merits. 144 These statutes do so with the purpose of quickly dismissing
frivolous lawsuits that are intended to chill expression. 145
Anti-SLAPP statutes answer the same question as the Federal Rules by adding
an extra requirement to get to trial. 146 The Federal Rules set up the hurdles that
a plaintiff must overcome in order to get to trial in federal litigation. 147 Rules 8
and 12(b)(6) work to ensure that a plaintiff has adequately plead a claim for
relief—hurdle number one. 148 Rule 56 then ensures that there are genuine issues
that may be heard by a trier of fact—hurdle number two. 149 If these hurdles are
satisfied, a plaintiff may generally proceed to trial. 150 However, anti-SLAPP
136. See Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2019); Carbone v. CNN, Inc., 910 F.3d
1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018); Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir.
2015).
137. See Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1350; Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333–34.
138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
139. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
140. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
141. Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1350.
142. Id.; 5B ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1356 (3d ed.
2020).
143. 10A MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2712 (4th ed. 2020).
144. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2015).
145. See Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Metabolife
Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001); Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp.,
691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Mass. 1998); Robert T. Sherwin, Evidence? We Don’t Need No Stinkin’
Evidence!: How Ambiguity in Some States’ Anti-SLAPP Laws Threatens to De-Fang a Popular and
Powerful Weapon Against Frivolous Litigation, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 431, 437 (2017).
146. See Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333–34.
147. Id. at 1334.
148. Carbone v. CNN, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018).
149. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986); see also Carbone, 910 F.3d at
1350; Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334; Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC (Makaeff II), 736 F.3d 1180, 1189
(9th Cir. 2013) (Watford, J., dissenting).
150. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334.
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statutes effectively set up an additional hurdle by requiring a plaintiff to
demonstrate a probability of success, while still leaving the opportunity to
dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. 151 As a result, they answer the same
question—when must a court dismiss a claim before trial—because they provide
defendants sued for certain claims an extra way to dismiss a lawsuit before
trial. 152
As with the rules at issue in Shady Grove, the Federal Rules and anti-SLAPP
statutes answer the same question differently. Anti-SLAPP statutes typically
require a showing of a probability of success; 153 however, Rule 8 specifically
“does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage[,]” but rather
only requires a showing of a plausible claim for relief. 154 In fact, “a wellpleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof
of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.’” 155 Further, while requiring that a plaintiff establish a likelihood of
success, anti-SLAPP statutes stay discovery. 156 Conversely, while Rule 56 is
intended “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses,” 157
summary judgment is only warranted if there is no genuine dispute of material
fact after an opportunity for discovery. 158 Thus, the anti-SLAPP statutes address
the same question, yet provide a different answer.
The difference in answers is significant. 159 The Federal Rules must be read
together, 160 and when done, Rules 8, 12, and 56 provide the boxes that must be
checked to be entitled to trial. 161 Anti-SLAPP statutes add an extra box to check
off. 162 Not only does a plaintiff’s claim have to be plausible, it has to be probable
that they will succeed, and they must demonstrate that without discovery. 163
This extra requirement makes it harder for certain plaintiffs to get to trial purely
151. Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1350–51; Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333–34; Makaeff II, 736 F.3d at 1189
(Watford, J., dissenting).
152. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333–34.
153. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2015).
154. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (emphasis added); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement.’”).
155. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
156. See, e.g., CIV. PROC. § 425.16(g).
157. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986).
158. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 250
n.5 (1986); Carbone v. CNN, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018).
159. Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
160. Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964).
161. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333–34; Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1350. A plaintiff first must state a
plausible claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 8, 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56
(2007). Then, at the close of discovery, he must show that there is a genuine dispute of material
fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.5; Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1350. If a plaintiff can check those two
boxes, then he is “entitled to trial.” Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334.
162. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334.
163. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1), (g) (West 2015).
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because of the nature of the claim. 164 In Shady Grove, the statute in question
changed the standards for whether or not a certain type of suit could be
maintained as a class action. 165 Similarly, anti-SLAPP statutes change the
standards that certain plaintiffs must meet in order to be entitled to trial. 166 In
Burlington, the state statute “mandate[ed] a test of sufficiency that the Rules
reject” 167 by requiring an affirmance penalty on unsuccessful appeals as opposed
to the discretionary award for frivolous appeals imposed by the Federal Rules. 168
Likewise, anti-SLAPP statutes require the courts to apply a stricter standard that
the Federal Rules squarely reject. 169 The Ninth Circuit concluded that because
a defendant who brings an unsuccessful motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP
statute can still turn to Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, there is no conflict. 170 However,
this argument directly acknowledges that the anti-SLAPP statutes add an extra
requirement by saying that even if the claim can make it over that hurdle, it still
has to make it over the other two to get to trial. 171 Rather than showing that they
answer separate questions, that argument only goes to show that anti-SLAPP
statutes impose an additional burden on plaintiffs before reaching trial. 172
Further, the types of claims that anti-SLAPP statutes cover fall within the
sphere of Rules 8, 12, and 56. The First and Ninth Circuits both concluded that
anti-SLAPP statutes supplement the Federal Rules, and thus exist in their own
separate sphere because anti-SLAPP statutes only pertain to a specific category
of cases. 173 While it is correct that anti-SLAPP statutes do provide a
supplemental mechanism for protecting defendants against certain types of
claims, 174 they still exist within the sphere of the Federal Rules. 175 The Federal
Rules cover all actions brought in the federal district courts, with minor
exceptions. 176 Thus, they are general rules that apply to every type of claim
brought in federal court. 177 Anti-SLAPP statutes cover just a small subset of

164. See Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334.
165. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 399 (2010).
166. See Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1351.
167. Id. at 1355 (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987)); Burlington,
480 U.S. at 7.
168. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 7 (1987); see also Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1355.
169. See Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1350–51.
170. United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.3d 963,
972 (9th Cir. 1999).
171. See Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
172. See id.
173. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2010); Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973.
174. Godin, 629 F.3d at 88–89; Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973.
175. See Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334.
176. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
177. See id.
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claims within the large sphere of claims that the Federal Rules apply to.178 The
state statute in Shady Grove similarly imposed additional requirements for
certain types of class actions, while FRCP 23 applied to all types of class
actions. 179 The Court deemed the state statute’s method of following the Federal
Rule for some claims but singling out certain ones with extra requirements
impermissible. 180 Anti-SLAPP statutes operate in the same way as to Rules 8,
12, and 56. 181 Together, the Federal Rules govern pre-trial dismissal for every
type of claim brought in federal court; however, anti-SLAPP statutes single out
certain claims and impose an additional requirement. 182 As a result, their
“supplement” to the Federal Rules impermissibly intrudes into the sphere of the
Federal Rules.
Additionally, Congress has specifically taken certain types of claims and
placed them outside the sphere of Rules 8, 12, and 56, but it has not done so for
any of the claims that anti-SLAPP statutes typically cover. 183 For example,
FRCP 9(b) imposes a heightened pleading standard for fraud claims. 184
Similarly, Congress heightened the pleading standard in private securities
actions through the PSLRA. 185 However, only Congress may create exceptions
to the Federal Rules. 186 The states cannot. 187 As a result, state anti-SLAPP
statutes cannot create exceptions for typical SLAPP claims in federal court.
Anti-SLAPP statutes also cannot be read to avoid conflict with the Federal
Rules. In Planned Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit purported to read California’s
anti-SLAPP statute in such a way so as to “prevent the collision” of the antiSLAPP statute with the Federal Rules by reviewing the motion to strike “under
different standards depending on the motion’s basis.” 188 While a majority of
justices in Shady Grove agreed that courts should “interpre[t] the federal rules
178. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2015). Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 1
(“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district
courts . . . .”).
179. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 397, 400–01
(2010).
180. Id. at 400–01.
181. See, e.g., Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2019); Abbas v. Foreign
Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
182. Klocke, 936 F.3d at 245–46; Carbone v. CNN, Inc. 910 F.3d 1345, 1354–55 (11th Cir.
2018); Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334; Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC (Makaeff I), 715 F.3d 254, 274 (9th
Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
183. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2018);
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); see also Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1353; Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1335; Godin v.
Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 91 (1st Cir. 2010).
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
185. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.
186. See Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1335; Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010).
187. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1335; Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 400.
188. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 833 (9th
Cir. 2018).
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to avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies,” courts cannot “rewrite
the rule.” 189 The Ninth Circuit’s reading of the statute in Planned Parenthood
does exactly that. Rather than applying the California anti-SLAPP statute’s
probability standard, 190 the court decided that federal courts should apply either
the Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 standard depending on the motion’s basis, quite
literally rewriting the law to not conflict. 191 In doing so, the court illustrated the
conflict between anti-SLAPP statutes and the Federal Rules and the fact that
they cannot co-exist without directly colliding. 192
Anti-SLAPP statutes do not create substantive rights either. Godin and
Newsham concluded that anti-SLAPP statutes create substantive rights that
cannot be abridged by the Federal Rules. 193 However, a plain reading of the text
of any anti-SLAPP statute does not support this proposition. 194 Rather than
creating substantive rights, anti-SLAPP statutes merely provide extra protection
to rights that already exist via a mechanism that allows defendants to dismiss
189. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 430–31 (Stevens, J., concurring).
190. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2015).
191. Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 833.
192. Id. The defendants in Abbas similarly attempted to portray the D.C. anti-SLAPP statute’s
special motion to dismiss as a functional equivalent of the summary judgment standard. Abbas,
783 F.3d at 1334. In dismissing this approach, Judge Kavanaugh wrote:
The main problem with the defendants’ theory is that it requires the Court to re-write the
special motion to dismiss provision. Had the D.C. Council simply wanted to permit
courts to award attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in these kinds of defamation
cases, it easily could have done so. But the D.C. Council instead enacted a new provision
that answers the same question about the circumstances under which a court must grant
pre-trial judgment to defendants. Moreover, the D.C. Court of Appeals has never
interpreted the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act’s likelihood of success standard to simply mirror
the standards imposed by Federal Rules 12 and 56. Put simply, the D.C. Anti-SLAPP
Act’s likelihood of success standard is different from and more difficult for plaintiffs to
meet than the standards imposed by Federal Rules 12 and 56.
Id. at 1334–35.
193. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at
423 (Stevens, J., concurring)) (“Section 556 is ‘so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it
functions to define the scope of the state-created right,’ it cannot be displaced by Rule 12(b)(6) or
Rule 56.”); United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973
(9th Cir. 1999). But see Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 247 (5th Cir. 2019); Abbas, 783 F.3d at
1335; Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC (Makaeff I), 715 F.3d 254, 273 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
194. Makaeff I, 715 F.3d at 273 (Kozinski, J., concurring). As Judge Kozinski aptly stated:
The anti-SLAPP statute creates no substantive rights; it merely provides a procedural
mechanism for vindicating existing rights. The language of the statute is procedural: Its
mainspring is a “special motion to strike”; it contains provisions limiting discovery; it
provides for sanctions for parties who bring a non-meritorious suit or motion; the court’s
ruling on the potential success of plaintiff’s claim is not ‘admissible in evidence at any
later stage of the case’; and an order granting or denying the special motion is
immediately appealable. The statute deals only with the conduct of the lawsuit; it creates
no rights independent of existing litigation . . . .
Id. (quoting CIV. PROC. § 425.16).
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certain types of claims more quickly. 195 The Federal Constitution, state
constitutions, and state laws are the bases of these rights and claims—not the
anti-SLAPP statutes. 196 Thus, state anti-SLAPP statutes, as purely procedural
mechanisms intended to dismiss frivolous claims, do not create substantive
rights and cannot supersede the Federal Rules. 197
In sum, state anti-SLAPP statutes answer the same question as Rules 8, 12,
and 56 by governing pre-trial dismissal of certain types of claims. As a result,
the Federal Rules should control, unless they are invalid under the Rules
Enabling Act. 198
B. Shady Grove Step 2: Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56 are Valid Under the Rules
Enabling Act
The second question is whether or not Rules 8, 12, and 56 are valid under the
Rules Enabling Act. The Court in Shady Grove was divided over the appropriate
test for validity under the Rules Enabling Act. 199 However, Rules 8, 12, and 56
are valid under the Rules Enabling Act using both Justice Scalia’s and Justice
Stevens’s formulations.
Justice Scalia and the plurality applied the Sibbach rule—which asks whether
the “rule really regulates procedure” 200—to determine validity under the Rules
Enabling Act. 201 The question under this test is whether Rules 8, 12, and 56
“really regulate procedure.” 202 As Judge Kavanaugh noted in Abbas, that
question with respect to these three rules is relatively easy because a majority in
Shady Grove expressly stated that pleading standards and rules governing
summary judgment are “addressed to procedure.” 203 Further, Rules 8, 12, and
56 do not function to curtail a defendant’s rights; 204 rather, “they alter only how
the claims are processed.” 205 Together, the Rules simply regulate what must be
195. See Klocke, 936 F.3d at 247; Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1335; Makaeff I, 715 F.3d at 273
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
196. See, e.g., Makaeff I, 775 F.3d at 273 (discussing substantive rights created under state
laws).
197. Klocke, 936 F.3d at 247; Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1335; Makaeff I, 715 F.3d at 273 (Kozinski,
J., concurring).
198. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406–10 (plurality opinion); id. at 417–18 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
199. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406–10 (plurality opinion); id. at 417–32 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
200. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
201. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407. Judge Kavanaugh, likely correctly, concluded that Sibbach
should continue to be the rule because Shady Grove did not actually overturn it. See Abbas, 783
F.3d at 1336–37.
202. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14; see also Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407; Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1336–
37.
203. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1337; Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 404.
204. Carbone v. CNN, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018).
205. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 408.
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overcome to advance to trial—they do not create claims or rights, as discussed
above. 206 Accordingly, Rules 8, 12, and 56 “really regulate[ ] procedure” and
are valid under the Rules Enabling Act pursuant to the plurality’s test. 207
Rules 8, 12, and 56 are also valid under Justice Stevens’s test, which asks
whether the state law “is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it
functions to define the scope of the state-created right.” 208 As discussed above,
the state anti-SLAPP statutes do not create substantive rights and merely exist
to provide additional protection for rights found in the First Amendment, state
constitutions, and state laws. 209 The statutes do not define the scope of the rights
so much as they provide a “protective mechanism” for them. 210 Similar to the
statute in Shady Grove, which applied to claims based on any state’s law, 211 antiSLAPP statutes also operate to protect defendants based on the type of claim,
not the specific state’s own law. 212 As in Shady Grove, it is difficult to see how
anti-SLAPP statutes could be “so intertwined with a state right” if they are not
tied to the rights of a specific state but just to certain types of claims. 213 Thus,
even under Justice Stevens’s test, Rules 8, 12, and 56 are valid under the Rules
Enabling Act.
Because Rules 8, 12, and 56 are valid under both Justice Scalia’s and Justice
Stevens’s tests, they are valid under the Rules Enabling Act. Consequently,
because the Federal Rules are valid and govern pre-trial dismissal in federal
court, anti-SLAPP statutes should not be applied in federal diversity cases. 214
III. AN AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OR A FEDERAL ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTE WOULD ADEQUATELY PREVENT FORUM-SHOPPING, PROMOTE

206. Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1357.
207. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407.
208. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring).
209. Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 247 (5th Cir. 2019); Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC,
783 F.3d 1328, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC (Makaeff I), 715 F.3d 254,
273 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
210. Klocke, 936 F.3d at 247; Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1335; Makaeff I, 715 F.3d at 273 (Kozinski,
J., concurring).
211. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring).
212. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015).
213. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring); see, e.g., CIV. PROC. § 425.16.
214. While the special motions to strike are the most notable feature of anti-SLAPP statutes,
another distinctive feature is an award of attorney’s fees to a defendant prevailing on a special
motion to strike or dismiss. See, e.g., CIV. PROC. § 425.16(c)(1). However, these provisions cannot
apply in federal court either. Most state anti-SLAPP statutes only permit an award of attorney’s
fees if the defendant prevails under that specific motion. See, e.g., id. As a result, because the
award is dependent on the defendant prevailing under the statutorily proscribed method, the
attorney’s fees must rise and fall with the special motion. Thus, if the special motion cannot apply
in federal court, neither can the attorney’s fees provision.
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UNIFORMITY, AND PROTECT SLAPP TARGETS IN DIVERSE FEDERAL
LITIGATION
Because state anti-SLAPP statutes cannot apply in federal court, there are
several reasons that federal protection against SLAPPs is necessary. First, the
inapplicability of state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court gives SLAPP filers
great incentive to forum shop. 215 Not only would they not have to overcome an
extra pre-trial hurdle, but they also would not be subject to attorney’s fees if they
lose 216—a huge win for a typical SLAPP filer who is just trying to drag a
defendant through costly litigation. 217 Further, federal anti-SLAPP protection is
necessary because anti-SLAPP statutes serve important purposes in protecting
the speech and petitioning rights of American citizens by providing extra
protection to victims of meritless lawsuits intended to chill expression. 218 While
just over half of the states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes, nearly half still
have not. 219 Further, the strength of the protections in the statutes varies from
state to state. 220 Such an “uneven patchwork” of state anti-SLAPP laws
undermines the overall effectiveness of these efforts. 221 Federal protection
would increase uniformity and “protect the speech of all Americans in all courts”
215. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Newsham
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999). The plurality in Shady
Grove acknowledged the reality that allowing the Federal Rules to control would lead to forum
shopping. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 415–16 (plurality opinion). However, Justice Scalia
concluded that when it comes to a Federal Rule, it does not matter:
The short of the matter is that a Federal Rule governing procedure is valid whether or not
it alters the outcome of the case in a way that induces forum shopping. To hold otherwise
would be to “disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal
procedure” or Congress’s exercise of it.
Id. at 416.
216. Godin, 629 F.3d at 92.
217. Ho, supra note 4, at 551.
218. See Eric Goldman, Law Professor Letter in Support of SPEAK FREE Act, Santa Clara L.
Digit. Commons (Sept. 16, 2015), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/historical/1047/.
219. See Vining & Matthews, supra note 15; see also Goldman, supra note 218.
220. Jeremy Rosen & Felix Shafir, Helping Americans to Speak Freely, 18 FEDERALIST SOC’Y
REV. 62, 68 (2017). Some anti-SLAPP statutes are narrow and “apply only to actions brought by
public applicants against people who have challenged or opposed such applications to government
bodies” or to “speech seeking to influence decisions by the legislature or executive branch.” AntiSLAPP
Statutes
and
Commentary,
Media
L.
Res.
Ctr.,
https://www.medialaw.org/component/k2/item/3494 (last visited Apr. 7, 2021). On the other hand,
other states have statutes that are much broader and protect both speech and petitioning “in
connection with issues of public concern.” Id. Over the years, some states with weaker anti-SLAPP
statutes have taken to updating them to provide for more protection. Heather Goldman et al., New
York Becomes Latest State to Strengthen Anti-SLAPP Law, Providing Greater Protections for the
Exercise of Free Speech, Petition, and Association, JDSupra (Nov. 11, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-york-becomes-latest-state-to-49082/. New York was the
most recent state to make a significant update to its anti-SLAPP statute, expanding both the types
of claims the statute covers and the protections given to targets in November 2020. Id.
221. Rosen & Shafir, supra note 220, at 68; see also Goldman, supra note 218.
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by preventing SLAPP filers from bringing SLAPPs in states with weak or no
anti-SLAPP laws or in federal court. 222
Some critics contend that the First Amendment provides sufficient protection
for targets, who often prevail anyway. 223 They see anti-SLAPP statutes, which
“tip the balance” towards targets, as improper. 224 Others fear that a federal antiSLAPP statute with the hallmark fee-shifting provision would lead to a
significant “abuse[ ] and misuse[ ]” of the special motions to strike, as was the
case with prior versions of Federal Rule 11. 225 These criticisms are unfounded.
The fact that SLAPP targets often prevail is irrelevant—SLAPP filers do not
care whether they win or not. 226 Rather, their purpose is to wear down the target
and get them to stop speaking. 227 Accordingly, anti-SLAPP statutes are
important because they are not meant to help targets win, but rather to prevent
them from being dragged through costly, meritless litigation. 228 Further, while
anti-SLAPP statutes are intended to help targets, “tipping the balance” is not
improper because FRCP 9(b) and the PSLRA do the same thing in other types
of claims. 229 Additionally, unlike Rule 11, anti-SLAPP statutes deal with a
limited number of claims, and they often punish targets filing frivolous special
motions, so abuse of the statute would be minimal compared with that of Rule
11. 230 Despite these criticisms, a federal remedy is still the best way to protect
the speech and petitioning rights of American citizens. 231
A. Proposal #1: An Amendment to the Federal Rules to Heighten the Pleading
Standard in Common SLAPP Causes of Action
The first possible federal protection is an amendment to the Federal Rules
similar to Rule 9(b), which would heighten the pleading standard for claims
based on common SLAPP causes of action, such as defamation. Such a rule
would take SLAPP claims out of the sphere of Rules 8 and 12 and place them

222. Goldman, supra note 218.
223. Joseph W. Beatty, Note, The Legal Literature on SLAPPs: A Look Behind the Smoke Nine
Years After Professors Pring and Canan First Yelled “Fire!”, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 106
(1997).
224. Id.; see also Aaron Smith, Note, SLAPP Fight, 68 ALA. L. REV. 303, 329 (2016).
225. James W. Devine, Note, Rule 11’s Big-Mouthed Little Brother: How a Federal AntiSLAPP Statute Would Reproduce Rule 11’s Growing Pains, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 367, 387–89
(2011).
226. See Tate, supra note 7, at 803–04.
227. See id.
228. Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 106 P.3d 958, 967 (Cal. 2005) (quoting People ex rel.
Lockyer v. Brar, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 846 (Ct. App. 2004)).
229. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2018); FED.
R. CIV. P. 9(b).
230. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015).
231. See Goldman, supra note 218.

464

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70:441

into their own spheres, as some courts have tried to do. 232 Rule 9(b) was
intended to prevent frivolous fraud claims, which tend to damage the reputation
of the defendant. 233 Likewise, one significant impetus behind anti-SLAPP
statutes is the damaging and chilling effect that meritless suits have on targets
exercising their rights. 234 An amendment to the Federal Rules heightening the
pleading standard in SLAPP suits would resolve the conflict between state antiSLAPP laws and Rules 8 and 12 by raising the first hurdle that plaintiffs must
overcome to get to trial and preserving the plaintiff’s right to discovery prior to
summary judgment. 235
There are at least two possible options for the pleading standard. Rule 9(b)
requires plaintiffs to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake.” 236 As one option, the pleading standard for SLAPP claims
could also be particularity and require the facts serving as the basis of the claim
to be alleged with specificity. 237 Often under Rule 9(b) this requires a specific
showing of the facts of the claim. 238 Requiring such specificity in a SLAPP suit
would help to ensure the merit of the suit without being so stringent as to require
a showing of a probability of success. The particularity standard is also more
consistent with the Federal Rules because Rule 9(b) is the only exception within
the Rules to the pleading standards set forth in Rules 8 and 12. 239 Alternatively,
another option would be to require a prima facie showing of a likelihood of
success or a probability of success. Such a standard would be stricter and more
consistent with many pre-existing anti-SLAPP statutes. 240 This standard would
essentially ensure that all filers must overcome the same hurdle in both state and
federal court without adding an extra step, 241 even though it is more inconsistent
with the Federal Rules. Both standards provide workable options for a
heightened pleading standard.
An amendment to the Federal Rules would carve out a specific sphere to
provide for SLAPP claims by raising the height of the first hurdle that filers must
232. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Newsham
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999).
233. 5A ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1296 (4th ed.
2020); see also United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
234. Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Henry v. Lake
Charles Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164, 169 (5th Cir. 2009).
235. See Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334.
236. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
237. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); Sweeney Co. of Md. v. Eng’rs-Constructors, Inc., 109 F.R.D.
358, 360 (E.D. Va. 1986); see also Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364,
1371 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Fitch v. Radnor Indus., Ltd., No. 90-2084, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13023, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1990)).
238. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); Sweeney, 109 F.R.D. at 360.
239. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
240. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502 (West 2012).
241. See id.; Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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overcome to get to trial, while keeping the discovery and summary judgment
standards in place. 242 Further, Rule 11 still provides an opportunity for sanctions
to serve as an extra “slap” to filers who still attempt to bring SLAPPs.243 Thus,
an amendment to the Federal Rules is one potential method of ensuring antiSLAPP protection in federal court in a way that would embed the protection
within the existing framework of the Federal Rules.
B. Proposal #2: A Federal Anti-SLAPP Statute
Another potential federal protection is a federal anti-SLAPP statute. In recent
years Congress has made various attempts at such a statute, but none have been
successful. 244 Most recently, the SPEAK FREE Act 245 was introduced in May
2015, just after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Abbas. 246 A bipartisan effort, 247
the SPEAK FREE Act was designed to protect Americans from meritless
lawsuits targeting their First Amendment rights. 248 The Act’s structure was
similar to the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP statute and would have enabled
SLAPP targets to file a special motion to dismiss in actions arising from
expressions about an official proceeding or a matter of public concern.249 If the
target could make a prima facie showing that the claim was a SLAPP, the court
would have been required to grant the motion unless the filer could demonstrate
a likelihood of success on the merits. 250 The Act also provided for special
procedural requirements pertaining to discovery and fee-shifting should the
target have prevailed on the special motion. 251 However, the SPEAK FREE Act
was never passed. 252
Congress has only once enacted a statute outside of the Federal Rules that
serves to combat frivolous lawsuits. 253 The PSLRA heightens the pleading
242. See Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334.
243. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
244. See Rosen & Shafir, supra note 221, at 68.
245. SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. (2015). SPEAK FREE stands for
Securing Participation, Engagement, and Knowledge Freedom by Reducing Egregious Efforts. Id.
246. Id.; Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1328 (decided on April 24, 2015); Rosen & Shafir, supra note
221, at 68; Smith, supra note 224, at 326; SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, Pub. Participation Project,
https://anti-slapp.org/speak-free-act (last visited Mar. 25, 2021); H.R. 2304-SPEAK FREE Act of
2015, Libr. of Cong., https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2304 (last visited
Mar. 25, 2021).
247. The SPEAK FREE Act was sponsored by Representative Blake Farenthold (R-TX) and
had multiple cosponsors on both sides of the aisle, including Representative Anna Eshoo (D-CA).
H.R. 2304.
248. Id.
249. H.R. 2304 § 4202.
250. Id.
251. Id. § 4203(a), 4207(a).
252. The SPEAK FREE Act died in committee. H.R. 2304—SPEAK FREE Act of 2015,
Congress.gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2304?q=%7B%
22search%22%3A%5B%22HR+2304%22%5D%7D&s=5&r=1 (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
253. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2018).
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standard in private securities class actions, requiring plaintiffs to plead “with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
the required state of mind.” 254 The PSLRA also provides for fee-shifting for
successful defendants. 255 Rather than enacting a statute like the SPEAK FREE
Act, which would still add an extra hurdle to litigation procedures, Congress
should enact a federal anti-SLAPP statute similar to the PSLRA, which would
heighten the pleading standard and guarantee fee-shifting to provide more teeth
to the protections.
A federal statute like the PSLRA would accomplish the goals of anti-SLAPP
statutes while maintaining consistency with the Federal Rules. Such a statute
would have three major benefits. First, the heightened pleading standard, as
discussed above, would make it much harder to surmount the first hurdle in
federal litigation for these types of claims and would maintain the force of antiSLAPP statutes, making SLAPPs harder to bring and easier to dismiss. 256
Second, a provision providing for fee-shifting would both preserve the power
behind the anti-SLAPP statutes, which seek to deter frivolous suits through
punishment, and discourage forum-shopping by remaining consistent with state
anti-SLAPP statutes. 257 Finally, a federal anti-SLAPP statute similar to the
PSLRA would provide a necessary balance between accomplishing the goals of
anti-SLAPP statutes on a federal level and maintaining consistency with federal
procedure. Traditional anti-SLAPP statutes, with their special motions to strike
and stays of discovery, “cut[ ] an ugly gash through th[e] orderly process” that
the Federal Rules create. 258 Rather than imposing a process on the federal courts
that would greatly disrupt the carefully designed framework that already exists,
an anti-SLAPP version of the PSLRA would fit neatly within the pre-existing
framework. In doing so, the statute would be able to effectively protect the
speech rights of American citizens while working alongside the goal of the
Federal Rules to provide a cohesive federal procedure in the federal courts.
Consequently, a federal anti-SLAPP statute structured like the PSLRA would be
an alternative and effective way to enforce anti-SLAPP protections in diverse
federal litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
As various courts and commentators have increasingly agreed, SLAPPs pose
a significant threat to the First Amendment, and many states have enacted antiSLAPP statutes in an effort to combat this threat. 259 However, these statutes
254. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
255. Id. § 78u-4(c)(3).
256. See Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
257. Marc J. Randazza, The Need for a Unified and Cohesive National Anti-SLAPP Law, 91
OR. L. REV. 627, 628 (2012); Smith, supra note 224, at 331.
258. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC (Makaeff I), 715 F.3d 254, 274 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski,
J., concurring).
259. Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, supra note 220.
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unavoidably conflict with Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56 because they seek to
govern pre-trial dismissal of certain types of claims. Following the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence from Hanna to Shady Grove, such conflicts render the
state statutes inapplicable in federal court. Consequently, this inapplicability in
federal court, coupled with the already existing lack of uniformity among the
states, greatly hinders states’ efforts to protect SLAPP targets.
The federal government should work to protect targets in one of two ways.
One option is for Congress to heighten the pleading standard for SLAPP claims
and avoid additional procedures by amending the Federal Rules. Alternatively,
Congress could enact a federal anti-SLAPP statute that heightens the pleading
standard and provides for attorney’s fees to both make it harder to bring SLAPP
claims and to conform with federal litigation procedures. Either option would
have a significant impact in protecting the rights of average Americans simply
trying to have their voices heard by providing for quick dismissal of SLAPP
suits in federal court.
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